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that the idea of an act is impossible until the reflex physiological component is established. Thought is predominantly motor; and this is especially true of any thought which would raise the question of imitation. Thorndike may deny that a causal relation exists between the idea and the reaction; but it may still be that there is concomitance between the two, outside of experience. The doctrine of psychophysical parallelism is disregarded in the author's assumption without being either disproved or denied. The reviewer finds an apparent inconsistency between certain statements which are fundamental to Thorndike's general position. How is one to reconcile "the same situation will, in the same animal, produce the same response" (p. 341) with "of several responses made to the same situation" (p. 244)? How will these appear in the light of his principle of abstraction (p. 263)? How can all of these views be brought into relation with his definition of "situation" (p. 283)? What is there in the author's generalized Law of Effect (p. 244) which is not circular with his definitions of satisfying and discomforting (p. 245)?

The last chapter is well written and presents a probable psychology of the future. The author ventures to outline how comparative psychology may come to hold the same relation to the psychology of consciousness that biology now holds to physiology. No one now before the public is better fitted by training and experience to arrange this psychic series than the man who has taken the lead in so many other lines of research. Let us hope that Thorndike will find it possible to amplify his last chapter into a companion book in the *Animal Behavior Series*.  
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*A Text-Book of Experimental Psychology with Laboratory Exercises.*

By C. S. MYERS. Second edition. Cambridge, The University Press; New York, Longmans Green & Co., 1911. Part I., Text-book. pp. xiv., 344. Part II., Laboratory Exercises. pp. ii., 107.

Dr. Myers' Text-book was noticed in this JOURNAL, xx., 462, on its appearance. It has now attained a second edition—a matter of congratulation both to the author and to his countrymen; and it has been issued, wisely, in two parts.

I find little change in the Laboratory Exercises: an experiment on after-sensations of hearing has been removed, and two experiments on labyrinthine sensations have been added. The text of Part I. has been revised throughout. The most striking additions are the references to Head's 1911 *Croonian Lectures*, which appear in ch. ii. (Cutaneous and Visceral Sensations), xvi. (Muscular Effort), xvii. (Local Signature), xviii. (Sensibility and Sensory Acuity), xix. (Identity and Difference), and xxiv. (Feeling), and the new chapter on Thought and Volition. In the latter, Dr. Myers discusses the question of imageless thought. I am not sure that I understand him; but I will give what account I can of his position.

(1) There is, first of all, the matter of 'act' and 'content.' Dr. Myers believes that the 'act' is introspectively separable from the 'content' in such experiences as perceiving, imagining, attending, thinking, desiring, reasoning, but that it does not show specific differences; always what is left, when contents are removed, is "the conative experience of mental activity." In the case of thought, the separation of 'act' from 'content' is most easily made when (possibly is dependent on the circumstance that) there is difficulty or obstruction in the course of thinking.

(2) The 'object' or 'content' of thought is often imageless. In the race, meaning is prior to thought; and in the individual (in the rudimentary thought of the infant) thought is prior to language. Hence, while imagery and language are necessary for the growth of mind, it is not surprising that we, with this growth behind us, should, especially in abstract or unimpeded thought, employ a "short cut or abbreviation" whose final result is "mere awareness." To do this is, after all, only to discard the elaborate machinery of words and images for a more primitive tool of consciousness; though the tool has, of course, been formed and sharpened under the influence of mental development at large. As for the mechanism of awareness, "the probability is that we come to construct for ourselves various 'schemata,' as Head calls them, *i. e.*, systems of unconscious dispositions," upon the basis of which presentations are apprehended; thus we apprehend size under the unconscious influence of a schema of distance; and there are similar schemata for meaning, and for other spatial, as well as for temporal and logical relations. 'Mere awareness' would then, I suppose, stand for the lowest conscious terms in which a situation can be assimilated to a schema.

(3) Above both act and content of the thought stands a directive awareness: a knowledge, *e. g.*, of whether and how one can solve a given problem. "This need not be present in the form of a thought content;" that is to say, if I understand the author, it may exist simply as an unconscious schema.—

The index to both Parts is appended to Pt. I., so that the user of Pt. II. must turn for his references to the companion volume. This arrangement is a mistake. The author should also know better than to refer to Stout's "Analytical Psychology." E. B. T.

*The Philosophy of Music: a comparative investigation into the principles of musical aesthetics.* By H. H. BRITAN. New York, Longmans Green & Co. 1911. pp. xiv., 252.

The problem of a 'philosophy of music' is threefold. It has, first, "to determine as clearly and as accurately as possible the nature of the psychological processes involved in the musical experience." This psychological analysis is imperative: for little systematic work of the kind has yet been done; the mental reactions are so subtle and intangible that superficial work upon them leads to exaggeration and vague generalities; and only through psychology can music be related to other manifestations of human thought and action; the principles of musical criticism, *e. g.*, are in the last resort psychologically grounded. The philosophy of music has, secondly, to consider the relation of music, not only to other arts, but also to morality, religion, education. And it has, thirdly, to face the ontological question, and to discover "what is the essential, irreducible content when analysis has reduced the subject to its lowest terms." After an introductory chapter on Musical Form, these three problems are taken up. A 'Psychological Analysis of the Elements of Music' treats of the first,—of the psychology of rhythm, melody, harmony, musical expression; and a 'Philosophy of Music' treats of the other two,—of the universality, versatility and power of music, the content of music, musical criticism, and the educational value of music.

The book has evidently been written *con amore*, and there are parts of it that I have read with interest. I am also unreservedly on the side of any author who seeks to train the musical intelligence and heighten the musical feeling of his time. On the other hand, it is impossible to